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to	refrain	 from	preventing	or	even	discouraging	 it;	 it	 is	 to	allow	the	
wrong	 to	occur	without	 interference.	To	 tolerate	 their	bad	behaviour	
is	to	refrain	from	expressing	one’s	disapproval	of	it;	it	is	to	allow	the	
wrong	to	pass	without	condemnation	or	reproach.







are	 in	 fact	 condoning	 the	 eating	 of	meat.	 Before	 tackling	 that	 ques-
tion,	we	must	get	clearer	on	the	nature	and	varieties	of	 forbearance.	
Our	vegetarians	 face	not	one	but	 two	practical	questions,	 two	ques-














what	 they	do	 (wrong	 though	 it	be)	and	you	 shouldn’t	 express	 such	
feelings	if	you	have	them.	Perhaps	the	vegetarians	can’t	help	blaming	
ImprintPhilosophers’













but	 rather	 on	 claims	 about	 how	 the	 attitudes	 of	 others	 affect	 our	
well-being.4	This	doctrine	of	 civility	 tells	us	when	 it	 is	 appropriate	
for	people	to	express	their	attitudes	towards	those	around	them.	The	












they	are	not	problematic	 in	 the	way	that	 legal	coercion	 is	 (Mill	 1961:	325).	
See	also	(Mill	1961:	38).
4.	 Another	approach	would	be	 to	base	a	doctrine	of	 civility	on	 the	notion	of	
respect.	Buss	argues	that	showing	proper	respect	for	someone	involves	more	
than	merely	 recognizing	 their	 autonomy	by	accommodating	 their	projects	































of	 accommodation.2	 In	 employing	 the	word	 ‘toleration’	 to	mark	 the	
1.	 Most	(perhaps	all)	attitudes	involve	a	desire	to	express	those	attitudes:	to	feel	





2.	 For	 example,	 (Nagel	 1991:	 Chapter	 14),	 (Rawls	 1996:	 3–4),	 (Scanlon	 2003:	
198)	and	(Scheffler	2010:	321–2)	all	focus	on	accommodation.	Hobbes	may	be	
an	exception.	His	fifth	law	of	nature	requires	“that	every	man	strive	to	accom-








norm	derivable	neither	 from	norms	governing	 those	attitudes	 them-
selves	nor	 from	norms	 that	assess	our	expressive	actions	by	 the	de-
sirability	of	 their	 further	consequences. In	 this	paper,	 I	 shall	use	 the	









terms	 like	 ‘matter’	and	 ‘count’	 in	a	narrow	sense.	Something	matters 
(or	counts)	when	it	matters	to	someone	(or	counts	for	someone),	and	
something	matters	 to	 someone	when	 it	makes	 a	 difference	 to	 their	
well-being,	when	it	affects	their	interests,	when	it	helps	to	determine	














8.	 Your	contempt	might	also	matter	 to	me	 (or	 to	 someone	else)	 in	a	broader	
sense	of	that	term	in	which	things	that	have	no	impact	on	my	interests	can	
matter	to	me.	I	leave	this	open.





















I	 doubt	 civility	 can	be	 explained	 in	 this	way:	 telling	 someone	what	
they	need	 to	know	might	be	uncivil	 though	desirable	on	 the	whole.	
Should	 we	 instead	 focus	 on	 some	 specific	 desirable	 consequence?	
Hume	maintains	that	the	possession	of	good	manners	is	“a	quality	im-
mediately	agreeable	to	others”	(Hume	1975:	Section	8),	but	the	same	
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Y,	though	X’s	attitude	has	little	effect	on	what	Y	thinks	or	feels	on	the	
topic:	 counting	 is	not	 the	same	 thing	as	 influence.	 In	a	 relationship	
of	common	purpose,	like	a	sports	team	or	military	unit,	an	important	
source	of	motivation	is	the	idea	that	it	matters	to	you	what	your	lead-








come	our	 having	 the	 sort	 of	 connection	 that	 ensures	 that	 their	 atti-
tude	towards	my	marriage	matters	to	me	and	vice versa.	To	be	a	person	

























themselves;	 they	 are	 also	 glad	 that	 they	 are	 not	 actually	 despised.	






of	 a	 certain	 sort.	 Shared	personhood	 is	 insufficient.	 Perhaps	 certain	






opinion	 of	my	 choice	 of	 furniture	 counts	 for	 something,	my	 electri-




Friendship,	 neighbourliness,	 relations	 of	 hospitality,	 collegiality,	
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benefits	regardless	of	those	wider	effects. You	lead	a	better,	more	suc-
cessful	 life	simply	because	 those	who	matter	 to	you	express	admira-
tion	rather	than	contempt	for	you.12

























































their	 reservations,	 because	 concealing	 them	 would	 have	 tarnished	
our	relationship.	My	only	point	is	that	attitudes	(and	their	expression)	
help	to	determine	how	well	our	lives	are	going	quite	apart	from	the	
further	 consequences	 of	 people	 having	 those	 attitudes	 and	 express-
ing	 them.	 And,	 in	many	 contexts,	 contempt	 harms	 and	 admiration	
11.	 The	difference	between	expression	 and	 communication	 also	 explains	why	
people	are	often	happy	to	imply	(i. e.	communicate)	things	that	they	are	un-
willing	 to	 assert	 (i. e.	 express	 their	 convictions	 about).	 See	 (Owens	 2006:	
106–12).










the	 judgement	 that	 someone	wrongfully	 thought,	 felt	or	did	some-





cuse.	When	 the	 object	 of	 your	 infatuation	wrongs	 you,	 you	might	









Merely	 telling	 someone	 they	did	wrong	 is	often	a	 reproach	but	not	


















we	 typically	 feel	 at	 the	 public	 expression	 of	 unfavourable	 attitudes	
(and	regardless	of	 the	 further	consequences	of	 such	expression).	At	


















403,	 Scanlon	 2003:	 187,	Walsham	2006:	 4).	Where	 suppression	 is	 a	



















of	 ‘disapproval’:	 a	 disapproving	 attitude	 must	 matter	 to	 the	 object	
of	disapproval.	Disapproval is blame which counts.	The	motivation	 for	













































































idea	what	 they	 are.	 The	 rise	 of	 religious	 pluralism	 and	 agnosticism	
cuts	 intolerance	 off	 at	 its	 source	 by	 dissolving	 doctrinal	 differences.	














with	the	wider	world,	 the	attitudes	of	 that	world	will	count	 for	very	
little.	The	life	of	their	community	would	be	no	less	successful	simply	
because	the	rest	of	the	world	happened	to	disapprove	of	what	went	











baseless	do	not,	 for	 that	 reason,	 regard	 them	as	any	 the	 less	 intoler-
ant,	and,	 if	 I	 am	right,	 that	 is	because	baselessness	does	not	 render	
them	harmless.	King	James	I’s	life	went	worse	simply	because	he	was	
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interaction	of	 several	 values,	 of	which	 the	 value	of	 disapproval-sup-
pression	is	only	one.	
There	 is	 a	 foundational	 issue	 here:	 how	 could	 it	 ever	 be	 intrinsi-












like	 contempt	 and	 disapproval	 can	 itself constitute	 a	 harm	 to	 their	
object	(namely	where	you	are	dealing	with	a	friend	etc.)	quite	apart	
from	the	further	consequences	of	that	expression.	Taking	this	point	to	






suppression	can	be	 (at	 least	 in	part)	non-instrumental	 (i. e.	 indepen-
dent	of	the	further	consequences	of	suppression).	The	absence	of	the	
















tary	 coming	 to	 tolerate	desertion;	 certainly	 that	 is	not	how	 the	mili-
tary	would	describe	it.	Rather	this	is	a	case	of	their	earlier	intolerance	









3. Tolerance and Relationships
It	 is	 often	appropriate	 to	 suppress	one’s	disapproval	of	wrongdoing,	
to	fail	to	give	one’s	disapproval	public	expression.	I’m	calling	the	apt	
suppression	of	disapproval	toleration.25	Of	course	people	can	so	refrain	
when	 an	 expression	 of	 disapproval	 is	 appropriate	 or	 even	 required.	





























need	 for	 tolerance	aside)	be	pertinent	 to	express	your	view	 to	Tom	
or	someone	else.	In	sum,	it	looks	as	if	your	friendship	for	Tom	places	
you	under	conflicting	normative	pressures.	On	the	one	hand,	you	are	
meant	 to	have	a	special	care	 for	Tom’s	 interests	 (though	not	 for	 the	
stranger’s).	On	the	other	hand,	you	can’t	simply	ignore	Tom’s	vices	as	
you	might	those	of	a	stranger.28
How	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 conflict	 created	 by	 Tom’s	 wrongdoing?	 If	
Tom	has	wronged	me,	I	can	forgive	him,	and	having	forgiven	Tom	for	
what	he	did,	it	is	no	longer	appropriate	for	me	to	express	disapproval,	
either	 to	Tom	or	 to	 anyone	 else.	 Indeed	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 appropriate	







namely	the ubiquity of accurate disapproval.	One	thing	that	creates	the	
need	 for	 tolerance	 is	 the	presence	of	 significant	normative	disagree-
ment.26	Normative	dissent,	 like	 that	between	the	carnivores	and	the	
vegetarians,	 creates	a	 situation	 in	which	each	party	 feels	 entitled	 to	
disapprove	 of	 the	 other,	 and	 so	 the	 need	 for	 tolerance	 increases	 in	
an	era	of	pervasive	disagreement	like	our	own.	But	tolerance	is	also	



























prosaic	 notions	 can	 take	 us	 before	we	 resort	 to	 “higher-order	 impartiality”	
between	different	moral	conceptions	(Nagel	1991:	155)	and	other	distinctive	
products	of	liberal	theory.
	 david	owens Tolerance as Civility
philosophers’	imprint	 –		11		– vol.	15,	no.	20	(august	2015)
against	others,	 it	 is	 frequently	apt	 for	me	 to	 refrain	 from	expressing	
disapproval	of	how	my	friend	or	my	fellow	guest	has	behaved	towards	








Where	 wrongdoing	 occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 relationship	 that	
gives	disapproval	a	special	significance,	tolerance	is	often	not	merely	
apt	but	actually	required	of	us	(e. g.	it	might	be	wrong	to	tell	a	stranger	
that	 you	 resent	 your	 friend’s	 insensitivity).	 Nevertheless,	 friendship	


















33.	 Different	 cultures	 weigh	 differently	 the	 competing	 values	 of	 sincerity,	















the	 appropriateness	 of	 forgiveness	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 these	













respects,	 tolerance	 is	 more	 flexible	 than	 forgiveness.	 As	 to	 wrongs	
30.	So	long	as	Tom	remains	unaware	that	I	disapprove	of	his	not	paying	his	taxes,	
our	friendship	may	not	be	disrupted	at	all.	














attitude	and	 its	 expression.	And	 surely	one	 intrinsically	valuable	as-
pect	of	friendship	is	the	concern	you	have	for	your	friend’s	interests,	so	
someone	who	values	friendship	correctly	should	regard	the	tolerance	






requires	you	 to	 tolerate	or	 forgive	 things	 that	you	wouldn’t	need	 to	
tolerate	or	forgive	in	a	stranger.	
4. Conclusion: Illiberal Tolerance?
A	doctrine	of	civility	tells	us	when	it	is	appropriate	to	give	public	ex-
pression	 to	 interpersonal	 attitudes.	 In	 the	 first	 section,	 I	 sought	 to	
ground	a	doctrine	of	civility	 in	 the	 idea	 that	such	expression	affects	
our	well-being.	 In	particular,	 the	expression	of	an	unfavourable	atti-




















Something	 like	 this	 may	 be	 true	 of	 tolerance	 between	 business	
partners.	Writing	of	the	London	Stock	Exchange	in	the	1720s,	Voltaire	
observes	that	














disapproval.	 Compare	 Japan	 and	 Israel.	 I	 doubt	 there	 are	 universal	 truths	
about	 exactly	 how	much	 tolerance	 should	 be	 valued,	 but	 I	 find	 it	 hard	 to	
imagine	a	human	society	that	would	regard	the	public	expression	of	disap-
proval	with	complete	indifference.	
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find	 in	pre-modern	 societies,	 or	 in	 those	parts	 of	 the	 contemporary	
world	where	only	 lip	 service	 is	 paid	 to	 liberal	 ideals,	we	must	 seek	
other	resources.	Fear,	scepticism	and	sheer	indifference	no	doubt	play	
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